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REFINING THE DUE-PROCESS CONTOURS OF GENERAL
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Danielle Tarin
ChristopherMacchiaroli*

After two decades of silence, on June 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court issued two
decisions refining the contours of personal jurisdiction.' While generating much anticipation
and speculation, the Supreme Court's decisions offered little insight into the type of conduct
that may render a foreign 2 corporation subject to a forum's general personal jurisdiction. In J.
McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, a divided Supreme Court reversed the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a New Jersey court over a British corporation. Although six Justices concurred
in the judgment, no majority opinion was reached. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v.
Brown, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned the North Carolina Court of Appeals'
finding of general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. parent corporation. Despite its unanimity, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Goodyear was restrained and simply
reaffirmed an established principle of general personal jurisdiction overlooked by the North
3
Carolina courts.
J. McIntyre and Goodyear are notable, not because of the issues they resolve, but
rather because of the questions they raise. In both cases, the Supreme Court missed an opportunity to provide needed guidance to state and federal courts tasked with determining the level
of business contacts that may subject a foreign corporation to a forum's general personal
jurisdiction. This is particularly true in cases where foreign corporations have no physical
presence in the forum, yet generate large revenues from customers in the forum. This article
provides an overview of the current state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, notes the
implications of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, and analyzes the questions relating to
general personal jurisdiction that remain unanswered.

* The authors, along with former colleague Jaime M. Crowe, have successfully litigated personal jurisdiction
disputes in state and federal court. See, e.g., Curley v. Gateway Concrete Forming Sys., Inc., No. 1-09-2386,
2010 WL 4608754 (I11.App. Ct. Nov. 5, 2010); Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Xinyi Group (Glass)
Co., Civil No. 05-520-GPM, 2008 WL 3992687 (S.D. I11.Aug. 22, 2008).
1 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. V. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (Jun. 27, 2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (Jun. 27, 1011).
2 The use of the word "foreign" requires additional discussion. Traditionally, in the context of personal
jurisdiction, a "foreign corporation" could easily describe an Ohio corporation subject to jurisdiction in
Michigan, like a British corporation. With the rise of interstate commerce, comparing the exercise of
jurisdiction over an international company should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction over a
company based in a neighboring state. For purposes of this article, "foreign" applies to international
companies, while "out-of-state" applies to U.S. domestic corporations.
3 J. McIntyre and Goodyear addressed appeals from the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts. In the context
of personal-jurisdiction decisions by federal district courts, "[a] district court sitting in diversity has personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if a court of the state in which it sits would have jurisdiction."
Purdue Research Found.v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 779 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, in cases based on diversity, federal courts apply state laws governing personal jurisdiction so long
as they comport "with the requirements of federal due process." Id. (citation omitted); see Goodyear, 131 S. Ct.
at 2853.
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PERSONAL JURISDICTION
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of
a state tribunal's authority to proceed against a defendant ' 4 and protects "a person against
having the Government impose burdens upon him except in accordance with the valid laws of
the land. ' 5 Thus the general rule is that "neither statute nor judicial decree may bind strangers
to the State." 6 For the last seventy years, highlighted by the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in InternationalShoe Company v. Washington, courts have subjected a defendant to judgment
only when the defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with a forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."7
Defining the contours of InternationalShoe's holding has been an evolutionary process. Over
time, the Supreme Court has developed different tests depending upon whether the forum
sought to assert general or specific jurisdiction over a defendant.
General jurisdiction is the exercise of jurisdiction not based on the relationship of the
cause of action to the forum, but rather as a result of the defendant having such "continuous
and systematic" contacts with the forum that the defendant is essentially a resident of the
forum. 8 For example, general jurisdiction permits a shareholder to bring an action against a
Philippine corporation in Ohio, even though the cause of action did not arise in Ohio and did
not relate to the corporation's activities in Ohio. This is because the corporation's business
activities in Ohio were so extensive that they rendered the corporation a de facto resident of
that state. 9 This example evinces that general jurisdiction "is based on a concept of 'exchange.'"10 General jurisdiction "captures both the sovereign interest of the state and the
interest of the person in a fairly accessible forum .... by invoking constructive consent."'1 In
other words, "by invoking the benefits and protections of the forum's laws, the nonresident
12
defendant is seen as 'consenting' to being sued there."'
The Supreme Court's leading case on general jurisdiction is Helicdpteros Nacionales
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.13 In Helicdpteros, in seeking to determine whether a Columbian
corporation had continuous and systematic contacts with Texas, the Supreme Court examined
whether the corporation: (i) had ever been authorized to do business in Texas; (ii) had an
agent for the service of process in Texas; (iii) conducted business operations in or sold products to Texas; (iv) solicited business in Texas; (v) signed any contracts in Texas; (vi) had any
employees based in Texas; (vii) had ever recruited an employee from Texas; (viii) ever owned
real or personal property in Texas; (ix) ever maintained an office or establishment in Texas;
4 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).

5 Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 403 (1966); see also Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945) (explaining that the Due Process Clause "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or
relations").
6 J.McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787.
7 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)) (punctuation omitted).
8 Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851 (citing Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317).
9 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
to Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 375 (5th Cir. 1987).
'' Id.
12 Id.
13 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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4
These factors
(x) ever maintained records in Texas; or (xi) ever had shareholders in Texas.
were not meant to be exhaustive, but rather were part of an overall examination of the circumstances surrounding the corporation's relationship to the forum state.
In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction refers to the forum's exercise
of jurisdiction based on the acts and events giving rise to the plaintiff's cause of action against
the defendant. 15 Specific jurisdiction is based on the premise that "where a defendant 'purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws,' . . . it submits to the judicial power of an
otherwise foreign sovereign to the extent that power is exercised in connection with the defen6
For example, specific jurisdiction permits an outdant's activities touching on the State.'
of-state corporation to be subject to a breach-of-franchise-agreement action in Florida, even
though the out-of-state corporation's sole connection with Florida was that the agreement at
issue was negotiated with a Florida company and the out-of-state defendant was required to
send payments under the agreement to Florida. 17

In addressing specific jurisdiction in the context of commercial business, the Supreme Court in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson explained that a defendant's
placement of goods into the "stream of commerce "with the expectation that they will be
18
Such
purchased by consumers within the forum State" may indicate purposeful availment.
consistent
jurisdiction
personal
specific
purposeful availment may, in turn, suffice to establish
19
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
The contours of the stream-of-commerce doctrine were subsequently addressed by
the Supreme Court in Asahi Metal Industry Company, Ltd. v. Superior Court of California,
Solano County.20 While unanimously deciding that asserting jurisdiction would "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," the Supreme Court could not agree on a
majority view regarding the level of minimum contacts necessary to subject a foreign corporation to personal jurisdiction. Four justices, lead by Justice Brennan, decided mere awareness
2
that a corporation's product would enter the stream of commerce sufficed. ' Four justices,
lead by Justice O'Connor, decided that mere awareness did not suffice and required plaintiffs
to present additional facts evidencing the foreign corporation's intent to avail itself of the
jurisdiction. 22 Although not meant to be exhaustive, Justice O'Connor identified the following additional facts: "advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who
23
As no view could muster majorhas agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State."
24
Nearly 25 years passed before the Supreme
ity support, the issue remained unresolved.
Court revisited the issue of personal jurisdiction in J. McIntyre and Goodyear.
14 Id. at 411.

1' Id. at 414, n.8.
16 j. Mclntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787-88 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
17 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1985).
18 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980).
19 Id.

20 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
21 Id. at 117.
22 Id.at 112.
23 Id.

24 Left without any guidance, the U.S. Courts of Appeal are split on the appropriate test to apply, some
expressly adopting one test over another, while others have adopted a hybrid analysis. See, e.g., Luv n' care,
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The Supreme Court's Recent Decisions
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro
In J. McIntyre, plaintiff Robert Nicastro, an employee of Curcio Scrap Metal
("Curcio"), was operating a recycling machine used to cut metal called "the McIntyre Model
640 Shear." 25 Nicastro's right hand accidentally got caught in the machine's blades, severing
four of his fingers. 26 "The Model 640 Shear was manufactured by J. McIntyre Machinery,
Ltd. ("J. McIntyre"), a company incorporated in the United Kingdom, and then sold, through
its exclusive U.S. distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. ("McIntyre America"), to
Curcio." 27 In September 2003, Nicastro named J. McIntyre and McIntyre America as defendants in a product-liability action in the Superior Court for Bergen County. 2 8 The complaint
alleged that the shear machine "was not reasonably fit, suitable, or safe for its intended pur29
pose," "failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions," and was defectively designed.
Nicastro's principal allegation was that the McIntyre Model 640 Shear lacked a safety guard
that would have prevented the accident.30
J. McIntyre's principal place of business was in Nottingham, England, where it designed and manufactured metal recycling machinery and equipment. 31 J. McIntyre had American and European patents in recycling technology, and its president, Michael Pownall,
attended scrap metal conventions held in Las Vegas in 1994 and 1995, including one where a
representative of Curcio visited the McIntyre America convention booth. 32 Additionally,
from at least 1990 until 2005, J. McIntyre officials, including Pownall, attended trade conventions, exhibitions, and conferences throughout the United States. 33 While McIntyre America
was the exclusive U.S. distributor for J. McIntyre's products, McIntyre America addressed

Ltd. v. Insta-Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 470 (5th Cir. 2006) ("We have, therefore, declined to follow the
suggestion of the plurality in Asahi . . . that some additional action on the part of the defendant, beyond
foreseeability, is necessary to 'convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State."') (citations omitted); Commissariat A L'Energie Atomique v.
Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 F.3d 1315, 1321-22 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing a split of authority
amongst the circuits as to Asahi's stream-of-commerce analysis and noting that the Federal Circuit had not yet
decided between Justice Brennan's approach and the "more rigorous" approach adopted by Justice O'Connor);
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N The Water Publ'g, 327 F.3d 472, 480 (6th Cir. 2003) (adopting Justice
O'Connor's test); Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 207 n.13 (3d Cir. 1998)
(concluding that "[sJince the facts of this case satisfy the standards of both Asahi Metal pluralities, we do not
have occasion to select one standard or the other as the law of this circuit"); Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967
F.2d 671, 683 (1st Cir. 1992) (adopting Justice O'Connor's test); Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987
A.2d 575, 587-88, n.10-12 (N.J. 2010) (discussing the conflicting applications of the plurality opinions in
Asahi).

25 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577.
26 id.
27 Id.

28 Id. at 53, 987 A.2d at 577-8.
29 Id. at 53, 987 A.2d at 578.
30 Id.

31 Id. at 55, 987 A.2d at 579.
32 Id.
33 id.
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any requests for information about those products at the scrap-metal conventions and trade
34
shows in the United States.
The trial court granted J. McIntyre's motion to dismiss, deciding that it lacked sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey to justify the forum's exercise of personal
jurisdiction:
J. McIntyre had no contacts with the state of New Jersey-it did not directly
sell or solicit business in this State or have a physical presence here....
[It] had no expectation that its product would be purchased and utilized in
New Jersey. . . . [Although J. McIntyre] may have sufficient aggregate
minimum contacts with the United States to establish jurisdiction in this
country [, that] is not a reason to extend jurisdiction to the Superior Court
of New Jersey. . . . J. McIntyre could be haled into a New Jersey court
under the stream-of-commerce theory only if the company engaged in a
nationwide distribution scheme that purposefully brought J. McIntyre's
shear machines to New Jersey and the company purposely availed itself of
35
the protections of [New Jersey's] laws.
The New Jersey Appellate Division reversed, concluding that New Jersey's exercise
of jurisdiction "would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" and
was justified "under the stream-of-commerce plus rationale espoused by Justice O'Connor in
Asahi .... ,, 36 According to the Appellate Division, J. McIntyre placed "the shear machine
that injured [Nicastro] into the stream of commerce by transferring it to its distributor, McIntyre America, with an awareness that its machine might end up in New Jersey" and "engaged
' 37
This
in additional conduct indicating an intent or purpose to serve the New Jersey market."
conduct included J. McIntyre (i) designating McIntyre America as its exclusive U.S. distributor; (ii) knowing McIntyre America was not necessarily the machines' end user; (iii) sending
management officials to trade conventions; (iv) establishing a distribution scheme to sell its
machines to customers in McIntyre America's "exclusive sales territory;" and (v) designating
38
the shear to conform to U.S. specifications.
In affirming the Appellate Division's assertion of jurisdiction, the New Jersey Supreme Court explained that a foreign manufacturer that "knows or reasonably should know
that its products are distributed through a nationwide distribution system that might lead to
those products being sold in any of the fifty states must expect that it will be subject to [New
Jersey's] jurisdiction if one of its defective products is sold to a New Jersey consumer, causing injury." 39 The New Jersey Supreme Court approved jurisdiction pursuant to the streamof-commerce doctrine because J. McIntyre (i) targeted the U.S. market for the sale of its
recycling products by engaging McIntyre America, an Ohio-based company, as its exclusive
U.S. distributor for an approximately seven-year period ending in 2001; (ii) knew or reasona-

4

Id.

35 Id. at 56, 987 A.2d at 579 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
36

Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 399 N.J. Super. 539, 545, 945 A.2d 92, 95 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

2008) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111 (2008)).
37 Id. at 558, 945 A.2d at 104.
38 Id. at 558-9, 945 A.2d at 104-5.
39 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am. Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 76-7, 987 A.2d 575, 592 (2010) (punctuation and
citations omitted).
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bly should have known that its distribution system extended to the entire United States, because its company officials, along with McIntyre America officials, attended scrap metal trade
shows and conventions in U.S. cities where its products were advertised; and (iii) its appearance with McIntyre America at scrap metal trade shows and conventions was a calculated
effort to penetrate the overall American market.40
In asserting jurisdiction, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to allow a "manufacturer to shield itself [from liability] merely by employing an independent distributor-a middleman-knowing the predictable route the product will take to market." 41 The New Jersey
Supreme Court also refused to focus on the manufacturer's control of the distribution scheme
and reasoned that the proper focus should be placed on the "manufacturer's knowledge of the
distribution scheme through which it received economic benefits."4 2 If a manufacturer does
not want to be subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey when targeting the U.S. market, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that the manufacturer "must take some reasonable step to
43
prevent the distribution of its products" into the State.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. In a four-justice plurality opinion,
Justice Kennedy clarified Justice O'Connor's stream of commerce doctrine by reaffirming
that the primary jurisdictional inquiry is whether the defendant's activities "manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign."' ' 4 Justice Kennedy explained that transmitting
products may warrant asserting general jurisdiction only when the defendant targets the forum, not when the defendant merely anticipates that the products could reach a customer in
the forum. 4 5 Justice Kennedy further explained that the defendant's actions--not its expecta46
tions-determine whether a court may subject the defendant to its judgments.
Applying this analysis to the facts of the case, Justice Kennedy concluded that Nicastro failed to establish that J. McIntyre "engaged in conduct purposefully directed at New
Jersey" because it did not market goods in the State or ship them there. 41 In doing so, Justice
Kennedy dismantled the factual predicates underlying the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision. First, Justice Kennedy credited the corporate distinctions between J. McIntyre and McIntyre America, stating that "there [was] no allegation that the distributor was under J.
McIntyre's control." 18 Second, Justice Kennedy found that while conventions to solicit its
machines were attended in various states, they never attended any in New Jersey.4 9 Third, he
noted that at least one, but no more than four, machines including the machine at issue, ended
up in New Jersey.50 Justice Kennedy also relied on the lack of traditional contacts with the
forum: "the British manufacturer had no office in New Jersey; it neither paid taxes nor owned
property there; and it neither advertised in, nor sent any employees to, the State."'" Finding
no conduct establishing an "intent" to invoke or benefit from the protection of New Jersey's
40 Id. at 78, 987 A.2d at 592.
41 Id. at 77, 987 A.2d at 592.
42 id.
43 Id.

44 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2788.

45 Id.
46 id.
47 Id. at 2790.
48 Id. at 2786.
49 id.

50 Id.
51 Id. at 2790.
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laws, the plurality concluded that New Jersey was "without power to adjudge the rights and
liabilities of J. McIntyre." 52
Although Justices Breyer and Alito also found jurisdiction inappropriate, they de53
cided it was "unwise to announce a rule of broad applicability" without the Court having
fully considered the "relevant contemporary commercial circumstances" facing foreign and
out-of-state corporations that would be "relevant to any change in present law[.]" 54 Moreover, Justice Breyer concluded that the absence of jurisdiction was consistent with existing
precedent because there was only "a single isolated sale" of a product to New Jersey. 55
Based upon that fact, Justice Breyer reasoned that both Justices Brennan and O'Connor would
have agreed that "a single sale of a product in a State does not constitute an adequate basis for
asserting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, even if that defendant places his goods in
56
Moreothe stream of commerce, fully aware (and hoping) that such a sale will take place."
ver, in part because the record left many questions unanswered, Justice Breyer believed the
facts of the case presented an "unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic jurisdictional rules." 57 Justice Breyer's belief that a fact-specific inquiry is
required when assessing personal jurisdiction is a sentiment shared and lamented by state and
58
federal courts that regularly conduct these analyses.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented from the judgment of the Court and reasoned that those Justices finding jurisdiction improper failed to
consider all the relevant contacts supporting the exercise of general jurisdiction and condoned
a foreign defendant's contracting away liability to its U.S. distributor, which it engaged "to
ship [defendant's] machines stateside."59 The majority, Justice Ginsburg argued, effectively
permitted foreign manufacturers to avoid jurisdiction by shipping its products to the forum
through a distributor: "[T]he splintered majority today 'turn[s] the clock back to the days
before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a
user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it.' "60

52 Id. at 2791.
53 Id.

Id. at 2794.
11 id. at 2792.
56 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Asahi, 480 U.S. at 111-112 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (requiring
"something more" than simply placing "a product into the stream of commerce," even if defendant is "awar[e]"
14

that the stream "may or will sweep the product into the forum State") and id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(instructing that jurisdiction should lie where a sale in a State is part of "the regular and anticipated flow" of

commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only an "edd[yl," i.e., an isolated occurrence)).
57 Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
58 See, e.g., Cossaboon v. Maine Med. Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (explaining that assessing a

defendant's minimal contacts to a forum requires a "highly idiosyncratic" fact-specific inquiry "involving an
individualized assessment and factual analysis of the precise mix of contacts that characterize each case")
(citation omitted); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 570 (2nd Cir. 1996) ("The
assessment of minimum contacts is fact-specific and must necessarily be tailored to the circumstances of each
case.").

'9 J. Mclntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60 Id. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the PersonalJurisdiction
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAvts L. REv. 531, 555 (1995)).
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GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES OPERATIONS, S.A. V. BROWN
In Goodyear, Matthew Helms and Julian Brown, two thirteen-year-old soccer players who resided in North Carolina, died from injuries suffered in a bus wreck on April 18,
2004, outside Paris, France. 6 1 The decedents were traveling to Charles de Gaulle Airport to
return to North Carolina. 62 Representatives of the decedents' estates filed a suit for wrongfuldeath damages. They ("Plaintiffs") alleged that one of the bus tires designed, manufactured,
and distributed by the Goodyear Defendants failed when its plies separated. 63 The tire that
failed was a Goodyear Regional RHS tire manufactured by Goodyear Turkey, which operated
a manufacturing plant located in that country.
Plaintiffs sued a series of Goodyear affiliates, including Goodyear France, Goodyear
Luxembourg, and Goodyear Turkey on several theories arising from an alleged negligent design, construction, testing, and inspection of the Goodyear Regional tire in question. 64 The
foreign Goodyear defendants ("Foreign Defendants") moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction.
In denying their motion to dismiss, the trial court found, among other items, that:
" "from 2004 through a portion of 2007, at least 5906 tires made by Goodyear [Turkey] were shipped into North Carolina for sale, although not by
the original manufacturer";
" "from 2004 through a portion of 2007, at least 33,923 tires made by
Goodyear [France] were shipped into North Carolina for sale, although
not by the original manufacturer";
" "from 2004 through a portion of 2007, at least 6402 tires made by Goodyear [Luxembourg] were shipped into North Carolina for sale, although
not by the original manufacturer";
" "[t]he number of tires shipped into North Carolina from each of these
manufacturers may actually be substantially higher, in that [Goodyear's
U.S. entity], after being noticed for a 30(b)(6) deposition, failed to determine how many vehicles equipped with tires from these foreign defendant manufacturers [were] imported into the U.S. and shipped into North
Carolina for sale each year"; and
" the foreign defendants, "on a continuous and systematic basis, caused
tires to be sent into the United States for sale, and knew or should have
known that some of those tires were distributed for sale to North Carolina residents ....-65
Upon these findings, the trial court denied the Foreign Defendants' motion to dismiss and concluded that the Foreign Defendants had continuous and systematic ties with
North Carolina sufficient to permit the court to assert personal jurisdiction over the Foreign
66
Defendants.
61 Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 384 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 id.

65 Id. at 385-86.
66 Id. at 387.
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On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed and?relying principally on
North Carolina state law?reasoned that some of the tires produced abroad by Goodyear's
foreign subsidiaries reached North Carolina through "the stream of commerce":
the facts found in the trial court's order support its conclusion that Defendants "purposefully injected [their] product into the stream of commerce
without any indication that [they] desired to limit the area of distribution of
their product so as to exclude North Carolina ... and thereby purposefully
67
availed themselves of the protection of the laws of this State."
of their tires
The appellate court concluded that the Foreign Defendants' placement
68
in the stream of commerce justified the exercise of general jurisdiction.
After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied discretionary review, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorariand unanimously reversed. The Supreme Court clarified the
distinction between specific and general jurisdiction, rejecting the appellate court's conclusion
that the "stream of commerce" could ever support the exercise of general jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court explained that the stream-of-commerce doctrine applies when analyzing
whether a defendant is subject to a court's specific-not general-jurisdiction: "Flow of a
manufacturer's products into the forum, we have explained, may bolster an affiliation germane to specific jurisdiction." 69 The Court added that ties supporting the exercise of specific
jurisdiction "do not warrant a determination that, based on those ties, the forum has general
jurisdiction over a defendant." 70
Applying a proper general jurisdictional analysis, the Supreme Court held that the
Foreign Defendants' "attenuated" contacts with the forum fell "far short of 'the continuous
and systematic general business contacts' necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain
71
The
suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State."
for
Euprimarily
Supreme Court noted that the Foreign Defendants' tires were manufactured
in
sold
ordinarily
tires
from
and
construction
in
size
ropean and Asian markets and differed
in
business
to
do
registered
the United States. Moreover, the Foreign Defendants were not
did
not
State;
in
the
bank
accounts
or
employees,
North Carolina; had no place of business,
design, manufacture, or advertise their products in the State; and did not solicit business in the
State or sell or ship tires to North Carolina customers. 72 The Supreme Court also found that
the Foreign Defendants' sporadic tire sales in North Carolina through intermediaries were
73
Ultimately, the Supreme
insufficient to warrant a state's assertion of general jurisdiction.
Court's decision in Goodyear reaffirmed that the general-jurisdiction test is whether the for67 Id.
68 Id.

at 395 (quoting Bush v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 306 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1983)) (alterations in original).

69 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (emphasis in original); see

D'Jamoos ex rel. Estate of Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 106 (3rd Cir. 2009) (limiting the
stream-of-commerce doctrine to an analysis of specific jurisdiction); Purdue, 338 F.3d at 788 (explaining that
the stream-of-commerce theory "is relevant only to the exercise of specific jurisdiction" and that "it provides no
basis for exercising general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant").
70 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2849.
71 Id. at 2857 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
72 Id. at 2852.
73 Id. at 2856 (concluding that "mere purchases [made in the forum State], even if occurring at regular
intervals, are not enough to warrant a State's assertion of [general] jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in
a cause of action not related to those purchase transactions" (citing Helicdpteros, 466 U.S. at 418)).
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eign corporation's affiliations with a state "render them essentially at home in the forum
state."74

LESSONS LEARNED AND QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

The Supreme Court's recent decisions provide several guideposts to state and federal
courts tasked with analyzing personal jurisdiction issues. First, the focus of personal-jurisdiction jurisprudence remains "the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation," particularly the defendant's activities purposefully directed at that forum. 75 Second,
when analyzing personal jurisdiction, define the purported basis of jurisdiction: general, specific, or both. Third, conduct a separate and distinct analysis for each basis of jurisdiction,
noting that the stream-of-commerce doctrine applies only to specific jurisdiction. Fourth, anticipate courts more narrowly interpreting a forum's ability to assert general jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation. Purchases and now sales, even if occurring at regular intervals, seem
insufficient alone to constitute "the continuous and systematic general business contacts" warranting general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Furthermore, despite the access technology provides corporations to the global marketplace, the traditional hallmarks of general
jurisdiction indicating domicile-offices in the forum, for example-remain the touchstone of
corporate presence in the forum.
Notwithstanding these guideposts, the Supreme Court's decisions in Nicastro and
Goodyear are noteworthy not for the questions they resolved but rather for the questions they
left unanswered. What level of business contacts is sufficient to establish general personal
jurisdiction? Why were the Foreign Defendants' sales in Goodyear too "attenuated" to warrant general jurisdiction? Because they were sporadic? Because they were made through
intermediaries? Because the amount of sales or revenue generated from those sales was insignificant? Are sales or revenues generated from sales-regardless of the amount-insufficient
alone to warrant general jurisdiction?
The latter question has become more prevalent recently, with courts struggling to
determine whether they may exercise general jurisdiction over foreign corporations that have
no physical presence in the forum but generate large revenues from customers in the forum.
The courts' struggle is compounded when those large revenues represent a small percentage
of the corporation's total revenues. The due process contours of general jurisdiction over
foreign corporations under these circumstances are far from clear. Current jurisprudence,
which has strayed from the principles underlying jurisdictional analysis, presents "a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results." 76 Below we refocus the analysis to promote
more consistent, and ultimately predictable, outcomes that will enable foreign corporations to
structure their activities "with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit." 77

74 Id. at 2851 (citing Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
75 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 186 (1977).
76 Severinsen v. Widener Univ., 338 N.J. Super. 42, 49, 786 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001);
see Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction,34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 871 (2004)
77 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).
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GENERAL JURISDICTION BASED ON REVENUE
Absent further guidance from the Supreme Court regarding how they should evaluate a defendant's contacts with the forum, state and federal courts have been left to develop
their own standards. For over twenty-five years, in applying the "continuous and systematic"
standard, state and federal courts have considered (i) whether some jurisdictional factors
should weigh more heavily than others; (ii) what level of contacts tip the scale in the favor of
exercising jurisdiction; (iii) whether the contacts of subsidiaries and related companies can be
attributed to a foreign parent corporation; (iv) how to examine internet generated revenue for
purposes of assessing general jurisdiction; and (v) whether revenue generated from the forum
alone can buttress the lack of any other factors supporting the exercise of general jurisdiction.
Armed with an inherently imprecise standard and little guidance on applying it to
varying fact patterns, courts have developed a range of formulas to justify asserting general
jurisdiction over foreign corporations. Some formulas have deteriorated from the qualitative
analysis described above to, in some cases, a purely quantitative analysis. 78 Courts relying on
a quantitative analysis focus on the foreign corporation's sales or revenues, assessing whether
they are so "substantial" that they are "tantamount to [the foreign corporation] being constructively present" in the forum state. 79 Although perhaps a tempting alternative to the complexity of a qualitative analysis, relying on a quantitative analysis is problematic, and it leads
courts to produce arbitrary decisions and inconsistent results.
Sales to and revenues generated from sales to forum residents-without more-are
insufficient to vest forum courts with general jurisdiction. As one court has explained, relying
on sales and revenues alone destroys the distinction between a foreign corporation "doing
business" in the forum and "doing business" with a forum resident. 80 "Only the former is a
proper basis for jurisdiction." 8 1 If sales to or revenue generated from forum residents were
sufficient to confer general jurisdiction over foreign corporations, "it would follow that the
very existence of a business relationship with a [forum resident] would automatically sustain
[the forum's] jurisdiction."' 82 The Due Process Clause does not permit such a broad grant of
personal jurisdiction.
Although sales and revenue may indicate the extent to which a foreign corporation
does business in the forum, it is not the sole contact courts should consider in the generaljurisdiction inquiry. 83 Courts must examine sales and revenue in the context of all the foreign
78 See, e.g., Richter v. Instar Enters. Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp 2d 1000 (N.D. 111.
2009) (deciding that "[wlhere a
defendant's sales in a state represent both a small percentage of a defendant's total sales and a small volume of
sales over all, its contact witht the foum state cannot be said to be substantial" such that it warrants the exercise
of general jurisdiction); Farris v. Williams, No. 06-609, 2006 WL 1716285, at *2 (D. Minn. Jun. 21, 2006);
Injen Tech. Co. Ltd. v. Advanced Engine Mgmt., Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1194-95 (S.D. Cal. 2003); C.E.
Jamieson & Co., Ltd. v. Willow Labs, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 1410, 1411 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Bank of Taiwan v. UltiMed Int'l Inc., No. 95 Civ. 5657, 1996 WL 502411, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1996).
79 Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F. 3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
App. 3d 302, 310-15 589 N.E. 2d 802, 807-11 (111. App. Ct. 1992)
g0 Kadala v. Cunard Lines, Ltd., 226 I11.
(evincing that this principle applies not only to the "transacting business" test of the state's long-arm statute, but
also to the "doing business" test of general jurisdiction).
81 Id.
12 Id.at 310.
83 See Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v, Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F. 3d 1162, 1167 (1lth Cir. 2005)
("Factors relevant, but not dispositive, to this analysis include the presence and operation of an office in Florida,
the possession and maintenance of a license to do business in Florida, the number of Florida clients served, and
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84
These contacts, which Juscorporation's contacts with the forum as indicia of jurisdiction.
' 85
not
limited to, certain hallbut
are
include,
tice White called "affiliating circumstances,"
mark contacts that approximate a corporation's continuous and systematic physical presence
in the forum: whether the corporation (i) maintains offices or employees in the forum; (ii)
sends agents into the forum to conduct business; (iii) designates an agent for service of process in the forum; (iv) registers to do business in the forum; (v) owns real or personal property
in the forum; (vi) is a party to any litigation in the forum; (vii) has an ownership interest in a
forum corporation or business; and (viii) files tax returns in the forum. 86 Sales and revenue
alone do not establish that the foreign corporation is engaging in activities similar to those of a
commercial domiciliary.
Of those courts that rely on a quantitative analysis to assess a foreign corporation's
contacts, many use different formulas. Some courts assess the foreign corporation's gross
revenue, 87 others assess the percentage of revenue generated from forum residents, 88 others
assess the number of sales, 89 and still others assess a combination of these. 90 Such formulas
lead to "a bewildering array of seemingly inconsistent results" 91 and arbitrary decisions as
courts are forced to decide how many sales or how much revenue is enough.
Yet the problems inherent in the quantitative analyses seem obvious. If a foreign
corporation's sales in the forum state were 18% of total U.S. sales, this percentage might seem
sufficient to justify asserting general jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. This percent-

the percentage of overall revenue gleaned from Florida clients." (internal citations omitted)); Costa v. Keppel
Singmarine Dockyard PTE, Ltd., No. CV 01-11015MMM, 2003 WL 24242419, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24,
2003) ("[T]he totality of a defendant's contacts with the state must be assessed in determining whether the
exercise of general jurisdiction is appropriate.").
84 See generally World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99; Northrup King Co. v. Compania Productora
Semillas Algodoneras Selectas, S.A., 51 F.3d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir. 1995) ("In determining whether there is
personal jurisdiction, the courts consider the defendant's contacts with the forum in the aggregate, not
individually, they look at the totality of the circumstances.").
85 Id. at 295.

86 See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447-48 (1952) (concluding that although the
claim did not arise in Ohio, it would not violate due process for Ohio to adjudicate the controversy because the
corporation's president maintained his office in Ohio, kept company files in that office, and supervised from
that office "the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company"); Horizon, 421 F,3d at 1167; McGill v.
Gigantex Techs. Co., Ltd., No. 05C5892, 2005 WL 3436403, *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2005).
87 See, e.g., LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Based on
Hubbell's millions of dollars of sales of lighting produces in Ohio over the past several years and its broad
distributorship network in Ohio, we find that Hubbell maintains 'continuous and systematic' contacts with
Ohio.").
88 See, e.g., Farris, 2006 WL 1716285, at *2; Injen Tech, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1194-95.
89 See, e.g., Bolger v. Nautica Int'l., Inc., 369 11. App. 3d 947, 952 (I11.App. Ct. 2007) (declining to assert
jurisdiction, noting that "[tihe record shows sales of one to four boats each year in Illinois").
90 See, Richter v. Instar Enters. Int'l, Inc., 594 F. Supp.2d 1000, 1007 (N.D. I11.2009).
91 Severinsen, 768 A. 2d at 203; compare Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465-66
(6th Cir. 1989) (deciding that asserting general jurisdiction was appropriate over Alabama corporations because
$625,000 in combined revenues?although only 3% of the companies' total sales?constituted continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum), with Stemcor USA, Inc. v. Sharon Tube Co., No. 00 Civ. 9186, 2001 WL
492427, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2001) (declining to assert general jurisdiction where orders invoiced and
shipped to customers in New York accounted for .58% or $741,900.27 of total sales in 1999 and .73% or
$926,011.43 of total sales in 2000), and LeBlanc v. Patton-Tully Trans. LLC, 138 F. Supp. 2d 817, 819 (S.D.
Tex. 2001) (declining to assert general jurisdiction where defendant's work performed for a Texas business
accounted for 10-15% of defendant's revenue).
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age might not seem sufficient, however, if the foreign corporation's total U.S. sales were
$100,000 and thus forum state sales were $18,000.92 Conversely, if forum-state sales were
1% of total U.S. sales, this percentage might not seem sufficient to support general jurisdiction, but it might seem sufficient if the foreign corporation's total U.S. sales were $100 million and thus forum sales were $1 million.
The inconsistent results quantitative analyses produce stymie the very protections the
Due Process Clause was intended to protect. "Due Process requires that the defendant be
given adequate notice of the suit" before becoming subject to the court's general jurisdiction. 93 By "ensuring the 'orderly administration of the laws,'" the Due Process Clause "gives
a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit." 94 With adequate notice, a foreign corporation "can act to alleviate
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring insurance, passing the expected costs on to
customers, or, if the risks are too great, severing its connection with the State." 95 But foreign
corporations cannot effectively structure their conduct when courts' divergent quantitative
analyses produce inconsistent and thus unpredictable results.
Regardless of whether courts focus on revenue or percentage of revenue, even quantitatively substantial earnings may not indicate whether a foreign corporation "has established
a permanent and continuing relationship with the forum." 9 6 This is because relying on quantity neglects the qualitative analysis that remains the test for general jurisdiction. 97 "Whether
due process is satisfied must depend rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure." 9 8 Thus, in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, the Supreme Court noted in
dicta that although the defendant sold 10,000 to 15,000 magazine copies in the forum each
month, the sales were not qualitatively "so substantial" that they supported general jurisdiction. 99 "It is evident that the criteria by which [courts] mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot
be simply mechanical or quantitative." 100
By focusing on the number of sales, dollar amount of sales, or percentage of total
revenue generated by those sales, courts reduce the "doing business" test to mere sales or
revenue counting. But courts should analyze a foreign corporation's contacts to the forum not
92 See Colletti v. Crudele, 169 I11.App. 3d 1068, 1078 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (noting that "even $5,000 or $10,000
is a substantial amount from a number of perspectives, despite being a small percentage of a thriving company's
revenues"); cf. Dominion Gas Ventures, Inc. v. N.L.S., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 265, 268 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (deciding
that $70,000 of gross revenue from, and 7% of, defendant's Texas business did not warrant exercising general
jurisdiction).
93 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291.
94 Id. at 297 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319).

95 Id.
96 Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp., 348 111.App. 3d 26, 36 (l1l. App. Ct. 2004); see Helic6pteros, 466 U.S. at
408-409 (deciding that "mere purchases, even if occurring at regular intervals, are not enough to warrant State's
assertion of in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation in a cause of action not related to the
purchases.").
97 See Rhodes, supra note 76, at 871; Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (explaining that
the test for general jurisdiction is not "simply mechanical or quantitative").
98 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
99 Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 772, 779-80 (1984).
00 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.
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for the sake of counting sales or revenues, but to determine whether those sales and the revenue generated by those sales show continuous, permanent, and substantial activity in the forum justifying general jurisdiction.10 1 In other words, courts examine sales and revenue in
the context of all the factual circumstances, not to determine whether sales and revenue are
quantitatively "substantial," but rather to determine whether the revenue-generating activities
are qualitatively so "substantial" that they evidence continuous, permanent, and substantial
activity in the forum justifying general jurisdiction.
In Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corporation, for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded
10 2
These contacts inthat Beech's contacts with Texas did not warrant general jurisdiction.
cluded manufacturing airframe assemblies for a Texas business under contracts exceeding $72
million and purchasing over $195 million of goods and services from over 500 Texas vendors
03
The court explained that Beech did not afford
under sales agreements with Texas dealers.'
itself "the benefits and protections" of Texas laws, but rather "exercised its right to structure
its affairs in a manner calculated to shield it from the general jurisdiction of the courts of other
states such as Texas, carefully requiring the negotiation, completion, and performance of all
contracts in Kansas."' 1 4 Simply put, quantity is not enough to require a foreign corporation to
answer in a forum "in any litigation arising out of any transaction or occurrence taking place
10 5
anywhere in the world."
The inquiry is not necessarily how much revenue a foreign corporation generated,
106
Accordingly, some courts
but rather how the foreign corporation generated that revenue.
have considered where the sales were negotiated, executed, or performed and where the foreign corporation negotiated and consummated its contracts for, received payments for, and
performed its revenue-generating work. 107 They have also considered whether these activities occurred on a continuous, regular, and systematic basis. 108 Evaluating these factors-in
the context of all the foreign corporation's contacts-is the type of qualitative analysis the
Due Process Clause requires.
Although the Supreme Court did not clarify this qualitative analysis in Nicastro or
Goodyear, at least two Justices hinted that they may revisit general personal jurisdiction if
presented with a case providing "a better understanding of the relevant contemporary commercial circumstances."' 10 9 In the future, the Supreme Court might address how revenues,

101See Landoil Res. Corp. v. Alexander & Alexander, Servs., Inc., 918 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990).
102 Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370, 374-77 (5th Cit. 1987).
103 Id. at 373.

104 Id. at 375-76.
105 See Purdue Research Found. V. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 2003).
106 See Rhodes, supra note 76, at 872.
107 See, e.g., Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375-77; Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp., 807 N.E.2d 1004, 1017 (I1. App.
Ct. 2004) (declining to assert general jurisdiction where, inter alia, the nonresident corporation's employee, an
Illinois resident, "merely solicited potential clients to enter into contracts with representatives" of the
corporation's resorts located outside Illinois and "did not execute any contracts" inside Illinois); Kadala v.
Cunard Lines, Ltd., 589 N.E.2d 802, 810 (111.App. Ct. 1992) (declining to assert general jurisdiction over the
nonresident corporation because, inter alia, it "did not receive any revenues in this state; all payments were
received in its New York office.").

108 See Halsey v. Scheidt, 630 N.E.2d 905, 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (indicating that, rather than "the amount of
financial benefit it derives from the consumers of Illinois. . . . the key consideration is the corporation's
temporal relationship with the State" (citation omitted)).
109 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792-94 (Jun. 27, 2011) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("Because the incident at issue in this case does not implicate modem concerns, and because the factual record
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modem marketing, the Internet, local distributors, and corporate formalities impact generaljurisdiction jurisprudence. Until then, state and federal courts likely will continue struggling
with these issues and generating inconsistent results. Foreign corporations, in turn, likely will
continue struggling to structure their activities with some minimum assurance as to where
they might be subject to suit. Ultimately, however, courts should permit the quality, rather
than the quantity, of foreign corporations' contacts to serve as their analytical guide. Such an
analytical guide remains the key to achieving a decision that comports with due process.

leaves many open questions, this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that refashion basic
jurisdictional rules .... I would not work such a change to the law in the way either the plurality or the New
Jersey Supreme Court suggests without a better understanding of the relevant contemporary commercial
circumstances. Insofar as such considerations are relevant to any change in present law, they might be
presented in a case (unlike the present one) in which the Solicitor General participates .... This case presents
no such occasion .... ").
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